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A Legislative Proposal to End
Bootlegging in the Patent System
JAMES VAN SANTEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress, pursuant to its Constitutional mandate,' has estab-
lished a broad range of protection for the creative work of inven-
tors and artists.2 However, the stringent patent requirements
imposed by the Supreme Court3 and the nonapplicability of copy-
rights to utilitarian matters 4 leaves a great void in this range of
protection.
A patent, in effect, bestows a seventeen-year 5 monoply 6 upon
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1. '"The Congress shall have the Power ... To promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;.. "U.S. CONST. art.
I, §8.
2. Inventions are protected by the Patent Law, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976); artis-
tic creations are protected by the Copyright Law, 17 U.S.C. §§1-810(1976).
3. See part III C infra.
4. See part IV A infra.
5. 35 U.S.C. §154 (1976). "Every patent shall contain ... a grant to the paten-
tee ... . for the term of seventeen years . . . , of the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States. . . ." Id.
6. The Honorable Howard T. Markey, Chief Judge of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, warns that:
The loose application of the pejorative term monopoly to the property
right of exclusion represented by a patent, can be misleading. Unchecked
it can also destroy the constitutional and statutory scheme reflected in the
patent system.
If the patent be valid, it takes nothing from the public, as does the
monopoly against which our anti-trust laws are directed. On the contrary,
it gives to the public, by definition, that which the public never before had.
the successful applicant. In light of the monopolistic aspects of
this exclusive grant, the Supreme Court has developed a strin-
gent test of patentability.7 This view reflects the Court's determi-
nation that the purpose of the patent system is to add to the sum
of useful knowledge rather than to reward the individual.8
The problem with this approach is that it fails to recognize the
need for protection of technological developments falling short of
invention.9 An innovator needs some assurance that his or her ef-
forts will be protected from technological plagiarism. Indeed, it is
generally recognized in our society that innovators should not be
denied the rewards of their labor by those who would copy.
The Patent and Trademark Office has responded to the need for
protection of meritorious developments by the application of a
standard or patentability less stringent than that used by the
Supreme Court.o While this is effective to a degree, since rela-
tively few patents are challenged through the courts," it is not an
acceptable approach to the problem. Not only is this dual stan-
dard unacceptable from a theoretical standpoint, but it also suf-
fers from practical defects. A tenacious and well-funded litigant
can generally succeed in having such a patent invalidated.12
The purpose of this article is to examine the development and
reasoning underlying these two divergent views of patentability,
and the consequences of such a dual standard. It is concluded
that the patent system, in its present form, is not suitable to pre-
vent "fraud, piracy, and stealing." The development of a "techno-
logical copyright" is suggested as an appropriate legislative
remedy.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE EXISTING LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION FOR
INVENTION AND ARTISTIC ACHIEVEMENTS
The very apparent discrepancy between patent law doctrine as
determined and administered by the Patent Office and as deter-
mined and administered by the Supreme Court of the United
That a patent, like stocks, bonds, and other property, may be misused in a
plan violative of an anti-trust law does not render the property right in the
patent a monopoly in the anti-social anti-competitive sense, any more
than it does the property right in stocks and bonds.
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1160 n.8 (6th Cir.
1978).
7. See part II[ C infra.
8. The primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual
but the advancement of arts and sciences." Sinclair & Carroll Co., Inc. v. Inter-
chemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945) (footnote omitted).
9. See part IV infra.
10. See part III A infra.
11. See note 99 infra.
12. See text at note 122 infra.
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States, suggests that the Patent and Trademark Office, in league
with the patent bar, has established within the framework of the
patent system a sub rosa system of "technological copyright."' 3
That response has been made to the demand by entrepreneurs in
our industrial economy for the protection of their discoveries
against fraud, piracy and stealing.14 The conflict between such a
sub rosa system and the doctrinal precepts evolved by the judici-
ary results in distortions which to date have not been resolved
through the enactment of appropriate legislation.
The Patent Statute of 1953 fails to recognize that the "basic as-
sumption of our patent law may be false,"' 5 and actually tends to
perpetuate the conflict between the Patent Office and the
Supreme Court.16 Accordingly, it appears to be of particularly se-
rious consequence that there is a revitalized renewal of conflict
between the two competing philosophies as to the mission to be
fulfilled by the patent system. On the one hand, classical legal
doctrine provides that technological developments should be pro-
tected only if they are synergistic,' 7 non-obvious,' 8 "inventions"19
of geniuses and exhibit differences in kind.20 On the other hand,
there is the unofficial equitable doctrine that meritorious techno-
13. As used in this article, technological copyright shall refer to a patent
granted by the Patent and Trade Office upon the detection of a difference in de-
gree rather than a difference in kind. See discussion part V infra.
14. Fraud, piracy, and stealing are to be distinguished from independent de-
velopment. A patent gives the patentee an exclusive monopoly for seventeen
years from the date of the patent issuance. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976). What this arti-
cle envisions is a lesser degree of protection afforded an artist under the copyright
law.
15. Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 63
(1943).
The basic assumption of the patent law is that:
The primary purpose of the patent system is not reward of the individ-
ual but advancement of the arts and sciences. The function of a patent is
to add to the sum of useful knowledge, and one of the purposes of the pat-
ent system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning dis-
coveries and inventions." 60 Am. JuR. 2d Patents §1 (1972) (footnotes
omitted).
16. See text at notes 94-98 infra.
17. As used in the patent law, the term synergism refers to "the simultaneous
action of two Ior more] agencies which together produce a total effect greater than
the sum of their individual effects." Republic Industries, Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co.,
433 F. Supp. 666, 669 n.10 (S.D. Ill. 1977). See also note 87 infra and accompanying
text.
18. See generally 35 U.S.C. §103 (1976).
19. See part I infra.
20. 'There is no question that a 'different product,' that is, one differing in
kind rather than degree, is essential for patentability, but it is the difference in
logical improvements discovered by innovators deserve legal pro-
tection even though such improvements exhibit differences
merely in degree.21
The Patent Statute is limited to only four statutory classes of
patentable subject matter. (1) methods or processes, (2) ma-
chines, (3) manufactures, and (4) compositions of matter.22 Each
of these statutory classes is generally considered as embracing
subject matter of utilitarian purposes. 23
The right to proscribe the copying of original works is conferred
by the Copyright Statute24 which establishes several classes of
copyrightable material including writings, dramatic compositions,
works of art and photographic subjects. 25 Recovery for infringe-
ment of a copyright can be had only upon proof of copying.26 In-
dependent production is a good defense.27 But if the copyright
properties or characteristics that illustrates this difference in kind." Rem-Cru Ti-
tanium v. Watson, 147 F. Supp. 915, 919 (D.D.C. 1956).
21. The court's view on the requirement of difference in kind rather than de-
gree is apparent in United Specialties Co. v. Industrial Wire Cloth Products Corp.,
186 F.2d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 1951):
[Ilt has never been thought that mere difference, in those rare cases
where the difference in degree is so marked and involves the solution of a
problem long recognized but not earlier solved, so that a difference in de-
gree becomes, in effect, a difference in kind.
The author believes that the Patent and Trade Office holds a more liberal view
and will grant patents in matters involving a mere change in degree.
22. 35 U.S.C. §§1-293 (1976).
23. "Mhe basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Federal Constitution and the
Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from
an invention with substantial utility." 60 AM. JuR. 2d Patents §44 (1972), citing
Brenner v. Munson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
"The design of the patent laws is to reward those who make some substantial
discovery or invention, which adds to our knowledge and makes a step in advance
in the useful arts." Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882).
An older test of utility was that a thing could be considered useful if it
was nonfrivolous and nondeleterious, but it is now established that an in-
vention is not useful, within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. §101, merely because
it is not positively harmful to society. Utility means that the invention is
capable of being beneficially used for the purpose for which it was in-
vented. Hence, an invention is not useful if it is inoperative or if it con-
stantly exposes a user to death or great bodily harm. On the other hand,
an invention need not work perfectly in order to be useful. 60 AM. Jur. 2d
Patents §45 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
24. 17 U.S.C. §§101 et seq. (1976). The two requisites of copyright are (1) publi-
cation or notice of the proprietor's claim to copyright, and (2) deposit of certain
copies or prints with claim of copyright in the Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. §§401,
408 (1976). A nominal registration fee is also required. 17 U.S.C. §708 (1976).
25. 17 U.S.C. §102 (1976).
26. 17 U.S.C. §501 (1976).
27. "The test for copyright infringment is 'whether the one charged with the
infringment has made an independent production, or made a substantial and un-
fair use of the complainant's work."' Life Music, Inc. v. Wonderland Music Co.,
241 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), citing Nutt v. Nat'l Inst. for Imp. of Memory, 31
F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929).
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owner wins, his recoveries can be quite substantial.
28
There is thus a legislatively defined range of recognizable origi-
nality which extends from the "flash of creative genius" or syner-
gistic non-obvious discovery supposedly experienced by patent
greats such as Camras, Land, Steinmentz and Edison 29 (afforded
patent protection) to the efforts of the composer responsible for
so limited a creative development as the jingles employed in radio
commercials30 (protected by copyright law).
The sub rosa system of "technological copyright," if it can be
called such, resulting from the practice of the Patent Office in
granting patents merely upon the detection of a difference in de-
gree rather than a difference in kind, has its counterpart in a
more direct effort on an opposite tack by members of the bar to
extend the scope of the Copyright Statute to include subject mat-
ter having utilitarian purpose. It appears, however, that by doctri-
nal infusion the courts have written into our copyright and patent
laws the same rule of mutual exclusion as appears in the British
Law by express Act of Parliament. In other words, the courts
have held that Congress has provided two separate and distinct
fields of protection: the copyright for non-utilitarian objects, and
the patent for utilitarian objects.
IlL THE CONCEPT OF INVENTION
Before enactment of the 1953 Patent Statute, the existing laws
contributed little insofar as a definition of the standard of inven-
tion was concerned, merely providing that "[any person who has
invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manu-
facture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
28. See 17 U.S.C. §§501-10 (1976). The copyright owner may seek injunctions,
damages, an accounting, costs and attorney's fees as well as impounding of the al-
leged infringing materials and ultimately, if the court deems just, destruction of
such materials.
29. In 1940, Marvin Camras discovered the breakthrough which made mag-
netic recording feasible. It was patented on behalf of the Illinois Institute of Tech-
nology Research Institute (IITRI). Doctor Edward Land discovered and patented
the Polaroid Land Camera. Steinmetz is generally credited with having invented
fundamental ideas in alternating current systems and Edison the electric light
bulb.
30. In Jackson v. Quickslip Co., 110 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1940), a greeting card cop-
yright was enforced showing a bag with a tag "It's in the bag." In Roth Greeting
Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970), protection was en-
forced on a card showing "a colored drawing of a cute moppet suppressing a smile
and, on the inside, the words 'i wuv you."'
ments thereof, ... may upon payment of the fees required by
law,.., and due proceding had... obtain a patent therefore". 3 1
The substance of those provisions was not substantially changed
under the 1953 Patent Statute.32
A. The Patent Office Examination System
The "due proceeding had" consists of a preliminary examina-
tion in regard to the subject matter contained in each application
for patent conducted by the examining corps of the Patent and
Trademark Office. During the course of such proceedings, the
Patent and Trademark Office standard of invention is applied
which has been developed along the lines suggested by Judge
Learned Hand, "In such matters we look rather to history than to
our own powers of divination, if history is at hand."33
The historical record consulted by the examining corps of the
United States Patent Office consists primarily of prior patents is-
sued both in this country and those patents appearing in the jour-
nals of other countries having patent systems. To a lesser degree,
the technical literature developed in the various arts and sciences
is also used.
The examination system of the United States Patent Office is
truly astounding. Patentable subject matter is broken into a clas-
sification containing more than 90,000 subclasses and 309 main
classes. Applications are exmined by 1265 experts divided in ap-
proximately 68 separate art groups of 15 examining group units.
The preliminary examination conducted by United States Patent
and Trademark Office is considered by many to be quite rigid
since approximately thirty-five percent of the more than 100,000
patent applications filed each year are initially rejected.34
Although applications are frequently rejected for failure to com-
ply with formal requirements, it is probably fair to generalize that
the many applications claiming novel material are rejected at
least once as failing to define invention over the disclosures of
one or more prior art reference patents.
It is important to note that the system of examination followed
in the United States patent system takes the form of an ex parte
31. 35 U.S.C. §31 (1946) (derived from Act July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §24, 16 Stat.
201).
32. 35 U.S.C. §101 (1976).
33. H.C. White Co. v. Morton E. Converse & Son Co., 20 F.2d 311, 313 (2d. Cir.
1927).
34. Roughly two-thirds of the applications mature into formal Letters Patent -
72,832 in 1977 out of a total of 109,773 filed. The average length of prosecution is
approximately nineteen months. Statistics are based on figures released by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office in 1977. 1977 CoM. PAT. T.M. ANN. REP.
9.
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proceeding wherein the patent applicant is usually represented
by an attorney who "prosecutes" the application for patent until
the application is either ultimately abandoned or claims are held
allowed and the patent application is passed to issue.35
The claims 36 of the originally filed patent application are fre-
quently distinguished from the alleged anticipatory prior art
through the verbal sophistries of the technical claim language fre-
quently devised by clever attorneys who are themselves technical
experts familiar with the status of the history at hand. The practi-
cal effect of this type of practice is that the United States Patent
and Trademark Office permits many patents to be issued merely
upon detection of a difference in degree rather than the establish-
ment of a real difference in kind.37
Paradoxically the Patent Office relies on the stringencies of
competition to make the ultimate ruling regarding the propriety
of the patent monopoly grant in doubtful cases of patentability.
The mind-set of the United States Patent Office was articulated as
early as the 1869 pronouncement of Commission Fisher relative to
the test of utility in determining inventiveness. "Utility ... refers
rather to a utility of purpose than a utility of means .... The
best test of utility is use; and in the busy competition of trade this
test is soon applied, and the judgment of the inventor is affirmed
or reversed by an inexorable tribunal."38
In other words, in a case of doubtful inventiveness, the Patent
35. The Patent Office advises individuals who file applications pro se to obtain
the services of a competent Patent Attorney.
36. The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant re-
gards as his invention.
A claim may be written in independent or, if the nature of the case admits, in de-
pendent or multiple dependent form.
[A] claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the
limitations of the claim to which it refers.
35 U.S.C. §112 (1976).
37. Note the comment in Gelardin v. Revlon Products Corp. 164 F.2d 910, 913
(2d Cir. 1948):
The examiner had steadily refused to allow any claims in the face of Mor-
rison,. . . and he then yielded only after one of those personal interviews
which are so often successful. What arguments were used we cannot
know; but it is easy to understand how the obsessive persistence of a skill-
ful solicitor might overcome the examiner's doubts. After all, he might
have reasoned, it was not unfair to yield, if he was in genuine doubt. At
least that gave the applicant his only chance, and the public would have
protection of an equally interested opponent to present the other side.
38. Ex Parte Cheesbrough, [1869-1871] Dec. Com. Pat. 18, 19 (1869).
Office Examiner is inclined to issue the patent since a technical
development not "really" worth a patent grant will be properly
consigned to limbo by that "inexorable tribunal," the great Ameri-
can public.
B. The Judicial View of Patentability39
Judicial interpretation of the broad mandate given by the Con-
gress in establishing the patent system has resulted in a large,
unwieldy body of case law, most of which ultimately turns about
the question of what constitutes "invention." "The long history of
the word 'invention' in the Courts is an illustration of the word
magic of the savage or the universals of the medieval scholastic
realists." 40
Unlike the standards of invention employed by the Patent Of-
fice in handling an ex parte proceeding, the decisions of the
courts are usually based on a determination of the validity of an
issued patent involving subject matter in actual commercial use.
These determinations generally appear to be based on assump-
tion or premise that the test of inventiveness is supposedly objec-
tive; that a determinable difference in kind must exist rather than
a mere difference in degree, if the claims of a patent are to be con-
sidered valid.
The customary inter partes proceeding before the courts in con-
nection with litigated patent cases avails the court of many ad-
vantages never accruing to the Patent Office Examiner during an
ex parte proceeding. Opposing litigants make exhaustive investi-
gations of the prior patented art, the literature, the analogous
arts, foreign patented art and foreign literature, and trade publica-
tions. In addition, this mass of technical material is frequently in-
terpreted for the court by technical experts so as to assist the
court in establishing the status of the prior art and the affected
industry at the time the alleged "invention" occurred to measure
the differences between such prior art and the claim being consid-
ered, and to determine the level of skill in the particular art.
Although the trial courts hearing patent cases were permitted
to exercise broad judicial prerogative in a fairly enlightened envi-
ronment, before the Patent Statute of 1953 the so-called objective
test of inventiveness was laid down by the United States
Supreme Court in the somewhat ambiguous terms of whether the
39. "Day is day and night is night but who shall tell me where the day ends
and night begins?"-Judge Tomlin.
40. H.E. Potts, Invention and Graduated Validity, 24 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 629,
634 (1942) (footnotes omitted).
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patent met the test of "inventive genius."4 1
Guided by this flexible standard, the lower courts exercised
considerable latitude in the recognition of meritorious technologi-
cal achievement and frequently endorsed the Patent and Trade-
mark Office's findings of patentability by conveniently
disregarding or by minimizing the significance or pertinence of
the prior art offered as a defense to the validity of a contested pat-
ent. If the question of patentability appeared to be close, the
"doctrine of commercial success" was occasionally relied upon as
demonstrating the satisfaction of a longstanding need, thereby
making it easier for the trial court arbiter to recognize the pres-
ence of invention.42
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court prior to en-
actment of the 1953 Patent Statute were not particularly helpful in
formulating a truly objective test of "patentability." The Graver
Tank cases,43 for example, were regarded by some as an intima-
tion that the high court would tolerate an extension or liberaliza-
tion of the statutory standard of invention. In the first Graver
Tank case,4 the Court suggested that a finding of invention made
by two lower courts would not be upset in the absence of an ex-
ceptional showing of error. In the second Graver Tank case,45 the
classical "doctrine of equivalents"4 6 was reexamined and sus-
41. The usage of the word genius in determining inventiveness has been
widely used as evidenced by the compilation found in Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154-55 n.* (1950):
"Inventive genius"-Mr. Justice Hunt in Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S.
347, 357; "Genius or invention" -Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Smith v. Whit-
man Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 681; "Intuitive genius" -Mr. Justice Brown
in Potts v. Creager, 155 U.S. 597, 607; "inventive genius"--Mr. Justice Stone
in Concrete Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U.S. 177, 185; "Inventive ge-
nius"-Mr. Justice Roberts in Mantle Lamp Co. v. Aluminum Products
Co., 301 U.S. 544, 546, "the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of
the calling." Cuno Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91.
42. "[CIommercial success simply means 'much use in the trade.'" Bradley v.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 78 F. Supp. 388, 392 (E.D. Mich. 1948).
"The Supreme Court has indicated that commercial success is weighty, but not
conclusive evidence of utility." 60 Am. JuR. 2d Patents §46 (1972) (footnote omit-
ted).
43. Graver Tank Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271 (1940); Graver
Tank Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
44. 336 U.S. 271 (1949).
45. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
46.
The essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice a fraud on a pat-
ent. . . . "To temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from steal-
ing the benefit of an invention" a patentee may invoke this doctrine to
tained. The trial court's decision that the defendant had merely
colorably avoided literal infringement of patent claims and should
therefore be held as an infringer was affirmed. Although Mr. Jus-
tice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, it is significant to
note that both of these Justices quickly agreed with the majority
court that: "'[F] raud' is bad, 'piracy' is evil, and 'stealing' is repre-
hensible."4 7
The thrust of the dissent was that the protection of the business
community against fraud, piracy and stealing, although a com-
mendable purpose, should not be provided by the patent system,
particularly if it becomes necessary to extend or distort the ex-
isting statutory framework to effect such protection. However, the
temporary encouragement of the patent bar through the rare phe-
nomenon of validation of a patent by the United States Supreme
Court was short-lived.
Of particularly significant import was the decision in A & p,48
which involved an invention consisting of what the trial court
found was a supermarket check-out counter comprising "a new
and useful combination" of elements each known to the prior
art.49 The court of appeals had also held that the patent in ques-
tion was valid and that it presumably qualified for endorsement
by the Supreme Court on the basis of the ruling in the first
Graver Tank case.
The Supreme Court departed from the "two court endorsement
rule," however, and noted that the standard of invention applied
by the lower court was not sufficiently exacting. The Court firmly
resisted any temptation to give a new definition to the term "in-
vention," and merely acknowledged the nebulous character of the
concept by noting that the Index to Legal Periodicals lists "no
less than sixty-four articles relating to combination patents and
the theory and philosophy underlying the patent laws." 50 The
Court also took a sideways glance at the oft exercised lifesaver
''commercial success" and disposed of its possible applicability by
stating that: "commercial success without invention will not make
proceed against the producer of a device "if it performs substantially the
same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result."
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42. The theory on which
it is founded is that if two devices do the same work in substantially the
same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the
same, even though they differ in name, form, or shape. Machine Co. v.
Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125.
Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (footnote omit-
ted).
47. Id. at 612 (Black, J. and Douglas, J., dissenting).
48. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
49. Id. at 149 n.3.
50. Id. at 150 n.5.
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patentability."'1
Many have argued that the findings of invalidity in the A & P
case failed to shed light on any legal principle of patent law. In-
terestingly, the A & P case was a precursor to the current notion
of synergism. The Court declared: "the conjunction or concert of
known elements must contribute something; only when the whole
in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of
old devices patentable .... Two and two have been added to-
gether, and still they make only four."5 2
Not all of the justices were content to merely strike down the
patent. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for himself and for Mr. Jus-
tice Black in a special concurrence, projected the concept of "pat-
entability" to a constitutional level of abstraction in what appears
to be an attempt to doctrinally restate the objectives of the patent
system.
The standard of patentability is a constitutional standard; and the ques-
tion of validity of a patent is a question of law. Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S.
354, 358. The Court fashioned in Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U.S. 271,
275, a rule for patent cases to the effect that this court will not disturb a
finding of invention made by two lower courts, in absence of a very obvi-
ous and exceptional showing of error. That rule, imported from other
fields, never had a place in patent law. Having served its purpose in
Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., it is now in substance rejected. The Court
now recognizes what has long been apparent in our cases: that it is the
"Standard of Invention" that controls. That is present in every case where
the validity of a patent is in issue. It is that question which the Court
must decide. No "findings of fact" can be a substitute for it in any case.
The question of invention goes back to the constitutional standard in
every case. We speak with final authority in that constitutional issue as
we do on many others.
The attempts through the years to get a broader, looser conception of
patents than the Constitution contemplates have been persistent. The
Patent Office, like most administrative agencies, has looked with favor on
the opportunity which the exercise of discretion affords to expand its own
jurisdiction. And so it has placed a host of gadgets under the armour of
patents - gadgets that obviously have had no place in the constitutional
scheme of advancing scientific knowledge. A few that have reached this
Court show the pressure to extend monopoly to the simplest of devices. 53
The concurring justices then compiled what is termed a "list of
incredible patents which the Patent Office has spawned." The
list, according to Mr. Justice Douglas, "dramatically illustrates
how far our patent system frequently departs from the constitu-
51. Id. at 153 (citing Toledo Pressed Steel Co. v. Standard Parts, Inc., 307 U.S.
350 (1939)).
52. 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950).
53. Id. at 155-56 (Douglas, J., concurring).
tional standards which are supposed to govern."54
Following the A & P decision in 1950, a substantial number of
lower courts yielded to the Supreme Court admonition to "scruti-
nize combination patent claims with a care proportioned to the
difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an assembly of
old elements." 55 Apparently the lower courts were ready to agree
with the Supreme Court that:
The function of a patent is to add to the sum of useful knowledge. Patents
cannot be sustained when, on the contrary, their effect is to subtract from
former resources freely available to skilled artisans. A patent for a combi-
nation which only unites old elements with no change in their respective
functions,.. . obviously withdraws what already is known into the field of
its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful men.
56
One of the greatest contributors to the scholarship of patent law
was the late Learned Hand. In Jungersen v. Otsby & Barton Co.,57
Mr. Justice Frankfurter paid tribute to Judge Hand by adopting
his dissenting opinion 58 as his own.5 9 Judge Hand observed "that
Congress has never seen fit to extend its constitutional power to
'discoveries' as such in defining the realm of patentable items."
60
Rather, Congress has limited patents to the four statutory catego-
ries outlined in 35 U.S.C. section 101.61 Hand concluded,
"[hIowever trifling the physical change may be,.. . added 'inven-
tion,' is needed; and 'invention,' whatever else it may be, is within
the category of mental activities and of those alone."62
C. The Patent Statute of 1953
Subsequent to Jungersen, Congress passed a new patent act
which went into effect on January 1, 1953.63 This act adopted a
new standard of invention-the test of nonobviousness 64-which
54. Id. at 158 (Douglas, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 152.
56. Id. at 152-53.
57. 335 U.S. 560 (1949).
58. Jungersen v. Baden et al., 166 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1948).
59. 335 U.S. 560, 569 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. 35 U.S.C. §101 (1976) Inventions patentable. Whoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title.
62. 335 U.S. 560, 569-70 (1949).
63. 35 U.S.C. §§1-293 (1976).
64. 35 U.S.C. §103 (1976). Conditions for patentability; non-obviousness sub-
ject matter.
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differ-
ences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the
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was of equal import to those of utility65 and novelty. 66
One of the clearest judicial descriptions of the 1953 Patent Stat-
ute analyzing the new standard of "invention" was made by Cir-
cuit Judge Learned Hand in Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.67
Judge Hand analyzed the applicable statute and the preceding
case law, holding that section 103 of the new patent statute sub-
stantially restored the original gloss in ipsissimis verbis of Hotch-
kiss v. Greenwood,68 namely, that a patentable change is
demonstrated if it had not been "obvious ... to a person having
ordinary skill in the art."69
Thus, Judge Hand found that section 103 of the new patent stat-
ute imposed a less strict test of invention than that required in A
& P and in other decisions of the last twenty-five years.
Therefore we at length come to the question whether Lyon's contribu-
tion, his added step, was enough to support a patent. It certainly would
have done so twenty or thirty years ago; indeed, it conforms to the ac-
cepted standards of that time .... We do not see how any combination of
evidence could more completely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the
change had not been "obvious * * * to a person having ordinary skill in the
art" --§ 103. On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come
up for decision within twenty, or perhaps twenty-five, years before the Act
of 1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the
claims would have been held invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very gen-
erally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to
insist upon a stricter test of invention that it used to apply-indefinite it is
true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103. Indeed, some of
the justices themselves have taken the same view.7 0
In footnotes omitted herein, Judge Hand listed samples of deci-
sions of courts of appeal which applied a "stricter test of inven-
tion" than that defined in the new patent statute at section 103,
and cited the Supreme Court decision of Jungersen v. Ostby &
Barton Co.71
The interpretation of the new patent statute by Judge Hand in
art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be nega-
tived by the manner in which the invention was made.
65. See note 23 supra.
66. Novelty as a prerequisite to the patentable invention, "involves presence
of some element or the new position of an old element in combination, difference
from anything found in any prior structure." National Slug Rejectors v. A.B.T.
Mfg. Corp., 164 F.2d 333, 335 (7th Cir. 1947). See generally 35 U.S.C. §102 (1976).
The 1952 reviser said of section 103 that, "the section is added to the statute for
uniformity and definiteness." 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 note (1970).
67. 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 911 (1955).
68. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
69. 35 U.S.C. §103 (1976).
70. 224 F.2d at 534-35 (footnotes omitted).
71. 335 U.S. 560 (1949).
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. received some endorsement, but was
not followed in other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, for example, acknowledged "the more liberal
standards announced in the Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. case," in
Steffan v. Weber Heating & Sheet Metal Co.,72 but in Caldwell v.
Kirk Manufacturing Co.,73 called attention to the fact that
"[ m] ore exacting standards for determining patentable invention
have been applied by the courts in recent years than was for-
merly the case."74
Judge Hand again had an opportunity to construe section 103 in
Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch
Co. 75 wherein he took a position somewhat reminiscent of the
suggestions made earlier by Judge Thurman Arnold before the
enactment of the 1953 patent statute.76 He indicated in the deci-
sion that the validity of a patent cannot be summarily determined
merely by a comparison of the prior art with the disclosure of the
patent.
[T~he validity of design patents like that of all patents depends upon
the general state of the industry involved. The amendment of 1952 § 103,
Title 35, -provides that "a patent may not be obtained * * * if the differ-
ences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the
art to which said subject matter pertains."
... [I]t seems to us that it was necessary to adduce the testimony of
those so skilled as to whether in their judgment it was the combination of
the three elements that constituted the attraction of the watch. Without
such testimony we cannot say that the success of the watch was not due
to the skill of the patentee in marketing the goods. We must therefore
await a trial in which the conditions of the industry may be explored
before we pass upon the issue of validity.77
Because much of the case law was built upon the metaphysical concept
of inventive novelty, great uncertainties existed. It is in the nature of
technology to develop in incremental steps. Every new invention draws
upon what is already known.
Decided in 1950, the A & P case was the last major patent deci-
sion of the Supreme Court prior to the Patent Act of 1952 which
72. 237 F.2d 601, 604 (8th Cir. 1956).
73. 269 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1959).
74. Id. at 509.
75. 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958).
76. Thurman Arnold, qua Judge Arnold, seemed to suggest at one time that a
further extension of the objective test was appropriate for trial court judges, even
to the extent of consideraing the effect of a patent grant. Such an approach could
conceivably require the study of an industry by non-legal experts to assist the
court in making some sort of a determination as to the possible adverse effects
produced by the establishment of a monopoly grant in reference to a particular
technological advance occurring within that industry. See Monsanto Chemical Co.
v. Coe, 145 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Potts v. Coe, 140 F.2d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
77. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d
637, 641 (2d Cir. 1958) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 6: 297, 1979] Bootlegging in Patents
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
was signed into law by President Truman and which went into ef-
fect in 1953. In 1965, after more than a decade of cases under the
new patent statute, the Supreme Court broke its fifteen year si-
lence on patent matters and granted certiorari in a so-called tril-
ogy of cases. 78 The Court definitively interpreted the meaning
and the requirements of the section 103 usage of "obviousness".
The Court carefully realigned the precodification authorities be-
hind the ancient and venerable decision of Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood,79 declaring that Congress had intended to set as the
test of patentability the requirements of a new difference in kind
which could be measured in terms of obviousness to a person of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art. The Court directed the manner
in which the lower courts were to proceed in conducting their ju-
dicial inquiry by stating, in what has probably become the most
frequently quoted language ever to appear in the patent jargon:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascer-
tained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.
Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the sub-
ject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial
success, longfelt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be uti-
lized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the sub-
ject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or
nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.
80
However, the Court resisted any temptation to find the less strict
test of invention suggested by Judge Hand. "We believe that this
legislative history, as well as other sources, shows that the revi-
sion was not intended by Congress to change the general level of
patentable invention."8 1
Mr. Justice Clark, writing for a virtually unanimous court,82
stressed language used by Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring
78. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1965). On the same day the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1965).
79. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850). In Hotchkiss plaintiff had acquired a patent
for the use of clay and porcelain in making knobs for doors and furniture. Plaintiff
sued defendant for patent infringement. Before deciding whether the patent had
been infringed, the court sought to determine whether the patent was valid. The
Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' finding that it was not.
Justice Nelson, writing for the majority, concluded that this substitution of one
material for another required only the amount of skill and ingenuity possessed by
an ordinary artisan in the particular trade. It was not an invention in that the ef-
fect of using clay was not distinguishable from that achieved by using metal or
some other material.
80. 383 U.S. 1, at 17-18 (1965).
81. Id. at 17, (footnote omitted).
82. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration of the Calmar v.
opinion in A & P: "This is the standard expressed in the Consti-
tution and it may not be ignored. And it is in this light that patent
validity 'requires reference to a standard written into the Consti-
tution' ."83
The decision resulted in the creation of a framework of relative
stability. However, this definitive concept of obviousness which
appeared following Graham v. John Deere Co., lasted only until
the Supreme Court re-introduced a judicial gloss which took the
form of the test of synergism. In 1969, the Court decided Ander-
son's-Black Rock,84 a case in which the inventor had combined a
heater with a paving machine, thereby eliminating the need for a
worker to preheat a joint in the pavement. Mr. Justice Douglas
speaking for a unanimous court stated: "A combination of ele-
ments may result in an effect greater than the sum of the several
effects taken separately. No such synergistic result is argued
here."85 This language was reminiscent of the language that had
appeared in the A & P case. 86
A recent Supreme Court decision which added fuel to the fire
was Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.87 The patent involved a cleaning
method for flushing manure out of cow barns. The record
presented to the Supreme Court depicted a stormy history of re-
view. The district court had originally invalidated the patent on a
summary judgment motion. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded for trial. The district court again invali-
dated the patent. For a second time, the appellate court reversed.
The district court granted a third trial on the basis of newly-dis-
covered evidence, and the court of appeals again reversed holding
that "'the combination of these old elements to produce an ab-
rupt release of water on the barn floor from storage tanks or pools
can properly be characterized as synergistic, that is result[ing] in
an effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken sepa-
rately.' "88
The Supreme Court sided with the district court and, harking
back to Greek mythology and the diversion of the river Alpheus
Cook and Colgate-Palmolive v. Cook cases. Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the
consideration of any of the three cases. Id. at 37.
83. Id. at 6. The Court in Graham stated optimistically: "[Tihe § 103 addi-
tional condition, when followed realistically, will permit a more practical test of
patentability ... We believe that strict observance of the requirements laid down
here will result in that uniformity and definiteness which Congress called for in
the 1952 Act." Id. at 17-18.
84. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvange Co., Inc., 396 U.S. 57
(1969).
85. Id. at 61.
86. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
87, 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
88. Id. at 282.
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by Hercules to flush the Augean stables, held that there was no
synergism displayed sufficient to warrant the statutory imprima-
tur of invention, regardless of the contrary conclusion reached by
the court of appeals on the same consideration. "We cannot agree
that the combination of these old elements . . .can properly be
characterized as synergistic ... [but] falls under the head of 'the
work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.' "89
The idea of infusing synergism with such new vitality has cre-
ated additional woes to those in the patent profession. Judge Wil-
liam C. Conner for the Southern District of New York, himself a
former patent trial lawyer, correctly pointed out that synergism in
a mechanical combination is a physical impossibility:
I would not try to interpret the synergism requirement literally, because, I
must confess, except in the chemical and pharmaceutical and electrical
arts, virtually every invention consists of a combination of old elements
and every element, considered individually, performs its customary func-
tion in the new combination. A lever always acts like a lever, a resistor
always acts like a resistor, and so on; and the overall performance of the
combination is always precisely equal to the contributions of the several
components, no more, no less.9 0
"[Tihe overall performance of the combination is always pre-
cisely equal to the sum of the functions of its components. In the
real world, two plus two never equals five."9 1
Current patent law symposiums suggest with alarm that the
Supreme Court has "legislated" a new test which somehow or an-
other transcends the usual statutory tests of novelty, utility and
nonobviousness. 92
Meanwhile, the United States Patent Office has spurned any
use of synergism by the Examining Corps as a test for determin-
ing the qualifications for a patent. Donald W. Banner, recently ap-
pointed Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, upon taking
office, echoed former Commissioner Dann in saying that he saw
no reasons to change the procedures of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office in response to the Sakraida case.93
89. Id.
90. W. Conner, Trial of Patent Infringement Cases. The Art of Swimming
Upstream, 1977 Am. PAT. L. Assoc. BuLLs. 619, 623 (Speech at Annual Meeting).
91. W. Conner, Some Highly Personal Reflections on Section 103. 5 Am. PAT. L.
Assoc. J. 77, 85 (1977).
92. David A. Anderson, Synergism in the Lower Federal Courts ; Homer J.
Schneider, Nonobviousness, The Supreme Court and the Prospects for a Stable
Law; John Marshall Law School Twenty-Second Annual Conference, More Devel-
opments in Intellectual Property Law-(February 23 and 24, 1978).
93. CH. PAT. L. A. BuLL. (1978). Former Commissioner Marshall A. Dann in-
Prior to the enactment of the Patent Statute of 1953, the test of
invention relied upon a finding of a "flash of genius," and the
court decisions indicated a preference for various objective stand-
ards. The 1953 Patent Statute substituted the statutory test of
"nonobviousness" and the Supreme Court in Graham v. John
Deere Co. supplied a definitive pattern of inquiry by which rea-
sonable objectivity could be pursued in the interpretation of the
statute. In recounting the history of the drafting of section 103,
Judge Rich of the Court of Customs and Appeals has said that the
key concept behind section 103 was to get away from the trouble-
some concept of invention and to write the law in terms of the re-
quirements for patentabilty. "This", he observed, "is the simple
idea which many courts and many patent lawyers still have not
taken."94
Have we once again closed the circle? Does the Supreme Court
expect a return to the application of the pre-statute standards
around a new magic word? It would appear that this is the case.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, at least, finds no
specific magic in synergism:
In the patent law context, "synergism" has no talismanic power; syner-
gism is merely one indication of nonobviousness. What is required, when
a synergism analysis is appropriate, is simply a determination that the
combination of elements in a patent produces "an effect greater than the
sum of the several effects taken separately.
'95
It may be inevitable that the patent bar shall continue to be
confronted with Janus approaches-the courts insisting on using
a supposedly objective formula which distinguishes inventions
from mere improvements, believing that a real difference in kind
is conceptually possible; the Patent Office granting patents as if
the difference between inventions and mere improvements were
one of degree, the degree being considered through the alterna-
tive allowance of broad, or highly restrictive claims.
The judiciary espouses objectivity while reacting to a subjective
element, pretending to have a formula that is objective and there-
sisted that the Patent and Trademark Office adhere to the statutory nonobvious-
ness standard, despite Anderson's-Black Rock and Sakraida, 949 O.G. No. 1, p.3 (8-
3-76); see also PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT JouRNAL No. 290, p. A-2 (8-12-
76).
94. Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came To Be, published in Coursebook,
1977 Patent Law Conference (B.N.A. 1978) at 1:209. Writing of current law, Judge
Clark's law clerk in Graham has said: "In reading the later cases, I lament along
with you the fact that the courts have strayed from the methodology in the Trilogy
cases.... It appears that what has apparently happened is that the search for
mots justes has been revived ...." Reed, Some Reflections on Graham v. John
Deere Co., published in Coursebook, 1977 Patent Law conference (B.N.A. 1978) at
2:301, p. 2:307.
95. Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 789 (8th Cir. 1978), citing Ander-
son's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co, 397 U.S. 57, 61 (1960).
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fore fair. Yet, as a practical matter, cases are decided according to
a subjective standard which is dependent on the personal, social,
and economic predilections of the judge.96
Perhaps we must assume that invention is indefinable because
the concept involves a subjective 'value judgment', or say with Dr.
Stringham that "inventive level is one of the law's standards or
norms, or values. The subsumption of any given instance must
depend on the exercise of human judgment, hunch, value criti-
cisms, gut reaction." 97
In other words, the concept of "patentability" is a legal fiction
and the sophisticated patent attorney would be well advised to re-
alize the limitations attendant upon the employment of such a
legal fiction as a tool of the trade. Such a sophisticate must be
sensitive to the element of change in the law; he must be versed
in the field of economics, and particularly, responsive to the cur-
rent economic attitudes towards monopolies and monopoly
grants; and he must be aware of the influence of the social sci-
ences on the judicial mind lest he tend to discount the importance
of social relationships.
IV. THE DILEMMA
The dilemma with which we are faced is manifested by a com-
parison of the practically unattainable standard of invention es-
tablished in the theoretical patent system visualized by Mr.
Justice Douglas 98 to the increased bootleg aspect of the patent
system as administered by the Patent and Trademark Office
which has been utilized by the business community with varying
degrees of effectiveness despite restrictive pronouncements by
the Supreme Court.
An important consideration in the analysis of this problem is
the realization that in recent years the incentive theory has been
so greatly emphasized that to many persons it appears to be the
sole justification for the patent system. The incentive to invent, if
it can be called that, is generated by the prospect of renumeration
and business success.
96. Cf., Mr. Justice Jackson in Jungersen, 336 U.S. at 572 (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing), "the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get
its hands on."
97. Stringham, OUTLME OF PATENT LAW 222 (1932).
98. See Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Co., 340 U.S. at 154-55 (1950).
The development of engineering technology in the contempo-
rary economy has produced a salaried class of professional inven-
tors, employed by big business, whose sole job it is to conceive
inventions. The inventor falling in this category is identified with
a technological development as an assignee; his personal contact
with the patent system, per se, is only vicarious.
The small and mid-size business enterprise, on the other hand,
is frequently operated by technically skilled owners or adminis-
trators who serve in a dual capacity as inventor and manager.
Survival of these business entities depends upon their ability to
keep in step with technological improvements.
Another classification of inventor found in the industrial econ-
omy includes both the individual inventor, completely independ-
ent of manufacturing business entities, and the professional
research laboratory technician, the outside inventor. The inven-
tions of an independent inventor or a research laboratory techni-
cian are salable commodities. Proper patent protection facilitates
identification of the intangibles conceived and sold by this type of
inventor. Reasonable anticipation of the issuance of a patent is
virtually a prerequisite to the actual marketing of the invention to
a prospective purchaser.
The issuance of a patent is, of course, looked upon by entrepre-
neurs as a convenient device to aid in financing developments, re-
couping investments, recovering research costs, depreciating for
tax purposes, et al. In this sense, the incentive theory is impor-
tant. It appears, however, that the underlying demand in the
business community is for a legal framework of protection for
"discoveries" made by a business enterprise against what has
been loosely and inaccurately termed "unfair competition."
More specifically, entrepreneurs at all levels of business en-
deavor demand protection of their original discoveries against
fraud, piracy and stealing; in other words, against "technological
plagiarism." They seek to prevent their competitors from copying
with impunity the technological developments for which they are
responsible, whether those developments represent a flash of cre-
ative genius or merely a display of industrial artistry or "technical
know-how."
The tendency of the Patent and Trademark Office to issue for-
mal Letters Patent upon detection of a difference in degree has
been favorably exploited by contemporary businessmen to obtain
protection against fraud, piracy and stealing in diverse fields of
competitive endeavor.99 In this regard, it appears that the action
99. Of all patents granted in the United States only a very small percentage
(less than 2%) are ever litigated. Thousands of successful business deals are
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of the Patent and Trademark Office is a response to a genuine
need heretofore unacknowledged by adequate legislation. This
need has been responded to by the Patent Office in the only avail-
able manner, namely, lowering the standard of patentability re-
quired to support the formal allowance of a patent grant.oo
Critics of the patent system have strongly emphasized that the
unscrupulous monopolist benefits unreasonably from the promis-
cuous issuance of patents since flimsy patents are used to coerce
and obstruct the efforts of an honest competitor attempting to
gain entry into an industry. It appears that "patent expense" is a
necessary expense of doing business in some lines of endeavor.
In many instances the so-called flimsy patent is obtained as a de-
fensive measure to obtain whatever slight degree of protection
might be available in preventing competitors from copying with
impunity, the commercial designs of others.
Neither the admonitions of the Supreme Court nor the 1953 Pat-
ent Statute have had a profound effect in successfully raising and
maintaining the standard of invention throughout the entire ex-
amining corps of the Patent Office. Generally, the momentum of
business activity in which the Patent Office finds itself is far re-
moved from the high level of constitutional abstraction estab-
lished by the Supreme Court. The difficulties encountered by the
Patent Office Examiner, in measuring the quantum of a specific
technological advance, are conveniently and easily resolved
merely by acceding to the persistent patent applicant or his pat-
ent lawyer and by consigning the issued patent to the "inexorable
tribunal," the competitive market. In a sense, this is a free enter-
prise solution of a monopoly determination problem.1 0
based on patent applications and patents which have never come before the
courts.
100. It, has always been held that the issuance of a patent by the Patent and
Trademark Office as an administrative agent of the United States, will carry a pre-
sumption of validity. It is uncontrovertible that this presumption is now weak in
comparison to the findings of other administrative bodies. Because there have
been a number of foolish and unfounded grants in the past, well-founded judicial
theory will find some patents so clearly void that a mere reading thereof requires,
as a matter of law, a judicial declaration of invalidity. See Judge Chambers' opin-
ion in Syracuse v. Paris, 9 Cir., 234 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1956). Such letters are vulgarly
dubbed "zombies" or "scarecrows." Hansen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 238 F.2d 336,
339 (9th Cir. 1956).
101. An attitude towards interviews between Patent Office Examiners and at-
torneys, different than that expressed in Gelardin v. Revlon Products Corp., 164
F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir. 1948), see note 16 supra, is illustrated by the decision in Ap-
plication of Willingham, 282 F.2d 353, 356 (C.C.P.A. 1960):
The federal district courts are in more intimate contact with the
business world which demands protection for its discoveries
against fraud, piracy and stealing, and particularly with the busi-
nessmen that use the patent system to obtain such protection. A
district court decision distinguishing the A & P case is typical of
the circumvention of the attempts of Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr.
Justice Black to raise the standard of invention:
The Schreyer patent would seem to survive these rigorous standards
[the standards of the A & P case I; the combination of elements familiar to
the steam iron industry constitutes contribution to the art. The old ele-
ments in combination fulfill new functions; the hinged handle, for in-
stance, acts as a mount for the closure device and the closure mounted
thereon serves as a safety valve. In no sense could the elements, united
as they are here be classed as "what already is known. ' 10 2
Appellate decisions following in the wake of Sakraida indicate,
however, that on the appellate level, the doctrinaire approach of
the United States Supreme Court has been taken quite seriously.
In the First Circuit,103 the court sustained district court findings
which "established a sufficient 'synergistic' effect ... to cross the
legal borderline ... "104
In the Second Circuit, 0 5 the court saw Sakraida as having "laid
to rest" the "theory that [objective] 'secondary' considerations
must be given weight before a determination of obviousness can
be made." 0 6 A different panel of the same court split two-to-one
in holding a patent valid where the inventor revealed "a flash of
brilliance ... by departing from the norm" having produced an
"unobtainable result," and distinguishing Sakraida.'07
The Third Circuit,OS in a split decision, reversed a district court
stating, "we cannot agree that the district court's findings reveal
any more of a synergistic effect than [Sakraida].' '109 In the Fifth
We think it proper to take judicial notice of the fact that such interviews
are common and usually are conducted in the spirit of a free and open dis-
cussion as to the merits of the invention, the pertinency of the prior art
and the allowability of claims. We feel certain that the interview referred
to in the amendment of February 10, 1954, in the original application must
have been of this type and that appellant's attorneys must as a result of
the interview have been very confident of the competency of the examiner
to have permitted him to use his "discretion" in deleting claim 12 and sub-
stituting claim 15 therefor.
102. Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 159, 164 (D. Conn. 1951).
103. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453 (1st Cir.
1976).
104. Id. at 457 (citing Sakraida).
105. Digitronics Corp. v. New York Racing Ass'n., Inc., 553 F.2d 740 (2d Cir.
1977).
106. Id. at 748.
107. U.S. Philips Corp. v. National Micronetics, Inc., 550 F.2d 716, 723 (2d Cir.
1977).
108. Systematic Tool & Mach. Co. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 555 F.2d 342 (3d Cir.
1977).
109. Id. at 350.
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Circuit,110 the court agreed with the district court's invalidity
holding finding "no synergistic interplay.""' In the Sixth Cir-
cuit,112 the court characterized the "concept of synergistic result"
as having "evolved to determine what constitutes the 'key re-
quirement,' of patentability.""13
The Seventh Circuit initially reacted conservatively by viewing
Sakraida as being merely a reaffirmation of Graham v. John
Deere Co.114 However, in St. Regis Paper Co. v. Bemis Co.,1 15 a
split panel reversed a district court holding of validity, supported
in full by Graham v. John Deere Co. findings, on the ground that:
"Unless the combination is 'synergistic .... ' it cannot be pat-
ented."1 1 6
The Ninth Circuit reversed a district court and invalidated a
patent without relying significantly on Sakraida.1 7 The Tenth
Circuit, in Rutter v. Williams,118 invalidated a patent and reversed
a district court, but cited Sakraida only as authority for the lack
of a new or different function in the combination. 19
At the Third Annual Judicial Conference of the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals, one of the speakers reminded those in
attendance that the CCPA had at least impliedly endorsed
Sakraida in Application of Castner.120
Finally, in Roanwell Corp. v. Plantronics, Inc.,1 2 1 Mr. Justice
White and Mr. Justice Brennan dissenting in the denial of a writ
of certiorari to the Second Circuit noted specifically, "The District
Court here made no finding that the combination produced a syn-
ergistic or any other nonobvious result."122
110. Fred Whitaker Co. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 551 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1977).
111. Id. at 631.
112. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Acorn Bldg. Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.
1977).
113. Id. at 161 (quoting Philips Indus., Inc. v. State Stove Mfg. Co., 522 F.2d 1137,
1141 (6th Cir. 1975)).
114. Pederson v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 536 F.2d 1179, 1180 (7th Cir. 1976).
115. 549 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1977).
116. Id. at 838. In Scholl Inc. v. S.S. Kresge Company, 580 F.2d 244 (7th Cir.
1978), the court omitted mention of Graham and Sakraida and returned to a pre-
statute invention test as a criterion for obviousness.
117. Kamei-Autokomfort v. Eurasian Automotive Prods., 553 F.2d 603 (9th Cir.
1977).
118. 541 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1976).
119. Id. at 881.
120. 518 F.2d 1234 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
121. 429 U.S. 1604 (1977).
122. Id. at 1666 (White, J., dissenting).
Based on the general reactions noted, it would appear that any
litigious minded defendant sufficiently well endowed to finance a
lawsuit through the trial and appellate states, significantly in-
creases the odds of obtaining the invalidation of a contested, but
meritorious patent application. Chief Judge Markey noted "[ilt is
not uncommon for an infringer-contemnor to wrap itself in the
mantle of public defender against 'monopoly,' in reliance on an
unthinking monopolophobia it mistakingly hopes to find in the
courts."123 On a moral plane, it is easy to agree with Mr. Justice
Black that fraud is bad, piracy is evil and stealing is reprehensi-
ble. Thus, where the patent system fails to afford protection
against technological plagiarism, the entrepreneur has few ave-
nues of available relief.
A. The Mutual Exclusion Doctrine
The doctrine of mutual exclusion prevents recourse to the Cop-
yright Statute. 24 In the case of Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-
Brost Co.,125 a manufacturer of patented temperature recording
machinery attempted to invoke the law of copyright to protect the
sale of charts used on the recording machinery. The Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that such a chart was not subject to
copyright protection and held crucial the distinction between an
object of explanation and an object of use. The court held that
"objects of explanation" are subject to copyright protection and
"objects of use," must be safeguarded, if at all, by Letters Pat-
ent.12 6
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently had an ad-
ditional opportunity to consider another, closer case involving a
sculptural lamp base.127 The originator of the lamp base at-
tempted to obtain copyright protection for two statuettes of Bali-
nese dancers which were manufactured and sold with lamp
sockets attached for use as desk lamps. The plaintiff's claim of
copyright was based on the theory that the statuettes constituted
three dimensional works of art as currently classified under sec-
tion 5(g) of the Copyright Code.128 It was not disputed that the
defendant had placed an identical product on the market.
123. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fiber Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1160 n.8 (6th Cir.
1978).
124. "Literary property in a book cannot be protected . . . otherwise than by
copyright; and an exclusive right to an invention... cannot be secured by copy-
right, but only by a patent." 18 Am. Jim. 2d, Copyright and Literary Property §20
(1965) (footnotes omitted).
125. 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943).
126. Id. at 100.
127. Stein v. Expert Lamp Co., 188 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1951).
128. 17 U.S.C. §5(g)(1976). Stein was based on the predecessor statute.
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The trial judge held that the plaintiff's submission of the statu-
ettes with sockets to the copyright office was evidence of the in-
tended practical use and that the plaintiff could not find
protection under the Copyright Statute. The complaint was dis-
missed inasmuch as it related to alleged copyright infringement.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this order, citing
Baker v. Seldon.1 29 Parallel cases in other circuits by the same
litigants ultimately resulted in a decision by the United States
Supreme Court in favor of the copyright registrant.l
3 0
Other courts, attempting to protect meritorious technological
improvements against plagiarism, have reached a point of resig-
nation. For example, in Merit Manufacturing Co. v. Hero Manu-
facturing Co., Inc.,l3 1 a lower court affirmed a judgment
invalidating a patent relating to a bobbin used in the textile in-
dustry. The device had enjoyed an amazing success, with sales of
7 million in six years totaling $745,000.00.
In affirming the decision invalidating the patent, Judge Learned
Hand, speaking for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, stated:
It is, however, a complete answer that no change of structure was in fact
necessary, because no new use of an old device will ever support a patent.
That is not to say that the grant of a patent for a new use would be be-
yond the scope of the constitutional powers of Congress, which extend to
"discoveries"; it follows from the fact that Congress has been content
since the beginning to limit the exercise of its powers to an "art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter." This has been so often decided,
and we have ourselves too often discussed it, that we need do no more
than cite the decisions.
In obedience to the artificial limits with which the statute puts upon
invention, we must charge Gomberg with an acquaintance with Toegel's
"reel," including the use for which it was designed; so that the only re-
maining question is as to the changes he made .... Perhaps it would be
desirable that an inventor should not be charged with acquaintance with
all that the Patent Offices of this and every other country contain, and
with all that has ever been publicly sold or used in the United States; al-
though in that event it would be an inevitable corollary that infringements
should be limited to plagiarisms. With such consideration we have noth-
ing to do; as the law stands, the inventor must accept the position of a
mythically omniscient worker in his chosen field. As the arts proliferate
with prodigious fecundity, his lot is an increasingly hard one.
1 3 2
129. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
130. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The narrow issue presented turned on
whether a projecting lamp stub rendered a utilitarian nature to the artistic work.
The Court held it did not.
131. 185 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1950).
132. Id. at 351-52 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
In Frank B. Killian & Co. v. Allied Latex Corp.,13 3 Judge
Learned Hand, again stated:
Killian is entitled to whatever merit is due to the first person who satis-
fies a long existing need. Moreover, presumably, he designed his machine
from the ground up and without suggestion or cue; and we may well agree
that, taken as a feat, that displayed enough originality to support a patent.
However, as we have just said in disposing of the "Bead-Rolling Patent,"
the law does not use such a subjective test in judging a patent; on the con-
trary, it imputes to the inventor an omniscience which will again and
again deprive him of the reward that his talents as an individual might
otherwise deserve. That is a corollary of a monopoly, not limited to
plagiarists.
As we have said, the inventor must justify his contribution against all
that has gone before, known and unknown. Yet when he seeks to use the
arts failure to anticipate him as evidence of his own perspicacity, he must
appraise the art's ineptitude by the art's actual knowledge; he may not im-
pute to it in acquaintance with any part of what went before of which it
was not aware. It may result that he will benefit the art by a discovery of
what it had practically never possessed or had possessed and lost. But
there is no room for "lost arts" in the case of inventions, "described in
printed publications in this or any foreign country"; the statute is plain
and inexorable. 13 4
B. Nonobviousness as a Test of Patentability
In more recent cases, some courts have been persuaded to ar-
ticulate a public abhorrence of plagiarism in terms of a relation-
ship to the concept of nonobviousness. For example, in the
decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Copease Man-
ufacturing Co. v. American Photocopy Equipment Co.,135 the
court stated: "in the case at bar there is significant support of the
view that the Eisbein invention was not obvious, in the fact that
defendants purchased and copied the machines of the patentee
and one of his licensees." 3 6
Even the Supreme Court recognized that the Constitution, arti-
cle I, section 8, and federal statute,137 forbid copying of subject
matter which is disclosed and claimed in a valid United States
Letters Patent. Selling an article which is an exact copy of an-
other patented article is likely to produce confusion as the source
of the article. 13 8
The inferences that may be drawn from copying... are two-fold. First,
copying suggests that there was a significant innovation in the invention
which has been patented. Second, it suggests that the invention is signifi-
cantly useful so that competitors must react in some way if they are to re-
133. 188 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1951).
134. Id. at 943-44 (emphasis added).
135. 298 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1961).
136. Id. at 781.
137. 35 U.S.C. §§1-256 (1954).
138. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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main in business. While neither of these inferences can be considered in
connection with the threshold question of obviousness, they are significant
secondary indicators and are relevant to a finding of nonobviousness.
13 9
It appears that there is little hope for substantive change under
the 1953 Patent Statute. The Statute fails to deal effectively with
the dilemma resulting from inadequate legislative protection
against technological plagiarism of worthwhile discoveries. It
deals primarily with the symptoms manifesting the differences
between the outlook shared by the patent bar, the Patent and
Trademark Office, and members of the industrial economy on the
one hand and the Supreme Court on the other, but fails to effect
any cure of the disease which gives rise to the symptoms.
"Nonobviousness" appears to be the obverse of the "flash of ge-
nius" particularly if measured in terms of "synergism." Either ex-
pression implies measurement of the quantum of invention, a test
which utlimately hinges on subjective standards.
If we recognize that the concept of "patentability" is a useful
legal fiction analagous to such other legal fictions as "negligence"
and "due care," etc., its use as a tool in the law of patents will ac-
commodate limitations while reflecting the element of change
with the law. The concept, as such, enjoys a stability which is not
affected by legislative tinkering.
Accordingly, a sophisticated court responsive to attitudes to-
ward monopolies and monopoly grants, particularly in an era of
collectivism, will not blindly choose to be shackled by innocuous
terminology. With the refuge of subjectivism so convenient in the
test of "nonobviousness," any patent definition of a low caliber in-
vention will be in danger of eventual invalidation under the pres-
sures of rough justice and practical politics.
It is unlikely that an attempted expansion of the patent laws or
the copyright laws by judicial interpretation will ever receive the
approval of the Supreme Court even though such enlargement
would protect deserving novel and useful technological develop-
ment which fulfill the constitutional objective by promoting the
progress of science and the useful arts.
In Parker v. Flook,140 the Supreme Court by six-to-three major-
ity held that a process wherein the only novel feature was a math-
139. Systematic Tool & Mach. Co. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 390 F. Supp. 178, 194
(E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd 555 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1977). Cf., R. Robbins, Subtests of "Non-
Obviousness" A Non-Technical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV.
1169, 1178-80 (1964).
140. 98 S. Ct. 2522 (1978).
ematical formula was not eligible for patent protection.
Significantly, the majority of the Court underscored the limited
scope of its decision, stating, "[N]either the dearth of precedent,
nor this decision, should therefore be interpreted as reflecting a
judgment that a patent protection of certain novel and useful
computer programs will not promote the progress of science and
the useful arts, or that such protection is undesirable as a matter
of policy."'1 4 1 The decision emphasized that the courts must pro-
ceed cautiously when asked to extend patent rights, and presum-
ably to extend copyright rights as well: "Difficult questions of
policy concerning the kinds of programs that may be appropriate
for patent protection and the form and duration of such protec-
tion can be answered by the Congress on the basis of current em-
pirical data not equally available to this tribunal."142 In a
footnote, the Court observed that even among those who favor
patentability of computer programs, the seventeen-year protec-
tion of the current Patent Act is questioned as needed or appro-
priate.143
V. PROPOSAL: A LEGISLATIVE COMPROMISE
To effectively resolve, by way of legislative compromise, the
difficulties inherent in recognizing the need of fairness and justice
in dealing with the pressures and forces of our competitive econ-
omy, as acknowledged, alternatively by the Patent Office and the
aspirations of the Supreme Court, the existing framework of legis-
lation should be augmented to afford protection to technological
developments contemporarily classified as unpatentable inven-
tions or uncopyrightable subject matter.
For example, upon obtaining due proceeding in the Patent Of-
fice in connection with the prosecution of the usual patent appli-
cation, the examining corps of the Patent Office should be
authorized to recommend the issuance of a "technological copy-
right." This "technological copyright" should be made available
where the patent application does not represent a sufficient ad-
vancement of the prior art to warrant the grant of formal letters
patent and the attendant seventeen-year exclusionary privi-
lege.144 Procedurally, such a grant should be based on the same
141. Id. at 2528.
142. Id. (footnote omitted).
143. Id. n.19.
144. A discovery lacking novelty, i.e. an application rejectable under 35 U.S.C.
§102 (1954), would not be eligible for any protection. However, computer software
could be made eligible for protection under the theory of "technological copyright"
in complete harmony with the philosophy of the Supreme Court expressed in
Flook.
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full disclosure required of current patent applications, but re-
stricted by a single caveat stating that the protection afforded by
a single claim is limited in scope to "[tihe technological develop-
ments substantially as shown and described."
The legal rights granted under legislation should be similar to
those ah'eady enumerated in the well articulated body of case law
developed relating to the copyright statute. In this regard, the
recognized doctrines of dedication, of access, and of substantial
duplication could be effectively utilized.145
"Dedication,"'14 for example, would occur if the "technological
copyright" did not issue within "X" years after filing of the patent
application. This provision would give an incentive to prompt
publication and thereby reduce the backlog of applications in the
The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works has
recommended protection of computer programs with a copyright by statutory
.amendment. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPY-
RIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT, 2 (1978). A general discussion of the scope of cop-
yright laws protection and resolutions considered by the A.B.A. for changes in the
copyright law are found in [1971-1975] A.B.A. SEC. PAT., T.M., COPYRIGHT L. Paoc.
87-90 (1974); Id. 129-34 (1975). See also related 1974 and 1975 Committed Reports of
Section of Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law.
145. There was an effort made during the recent legislative negotiation to ex-
tend the new Copyright Law to protect the appearance of useful articles. Title II
of the Senate bill proposed to establish a new form of protection of "original orna-
mental designs of useful articles." The title which consisted of thirty-five sections,
offered a limited short-term form of protection for designs. That protection was
based on copyright principles but was provided separately from the Copyright
Law itself.
The House amendment deleted Title II of the bill entirely, together with two
subsections of section 113 dealing with the interrelationship between Titles I and
1. It revised the definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" in section
101 to clarify the distinction between works of applied art subject to protection
under the bill and industrial designs not subject to copyright protection.
The Conference Committee adopted the House amendments. See H.R. REP. No.
94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1976) reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659. More specifically, under the bill, section 201 of proposed Title 11 con-
templated 5 year protection, renewable for 5 additional years, beginning with the
date of first publishing a design, for a useful article having features of two or three
dimensions which make an article attractive or distinct in appearance. So far as
determinable, Title H was ultimately stricken from the bill for no reported reason
other than that the legislators lacked the time and the inclination to hold further
hearings.
146. The copyright concept of dedication is that "once a work is published with-
out obtaining a copyright, it is dedicated to the public and may be republished by
others in any way they may see fit . . ." 18 Am. Juri. 2d Copyright and Literary
Property §84 (1965).
Here the concept of dedication would be that if the applicant did not prosecute
his application seasonably his work would be dedicated and opened to the general
public.
Patent and Trademark Office resulting from administrative ap-
peals or other prolongations of the patent application procedure.
Evidence of "access"147 would be necessary to prove infringe-
ment of a "technological copyright." Stated affirmatively, in-
dependent development would be a defense to a charge of
infringement. Since the purpose of the legislation would be to
protect discoveries against fraud, piracy and stealing, this charac-
teristic would serve to protect the honest inventor.
"Substantial duplication" is another doctrine found in the sub-
stantive law of copyrights and design patents which excuses mi-
nor similarities.14 8 A so-called technological copyright would not
be infringed upon unless the act of infringement had the ear-
marks of "access" coupled with substantial duplication.149
Each of these concepts are generally understood by members of
the legal profession and would minimize the difficulty and unfa-
miliarity encountered with the administration of a new body of
law.
It would further appear that the procedural mechanics of a
technological copyright provision could be administered by the
Patent Office within the reference framework now existing. This
would preclude the necessity of establishing any new bureaus or
administrative agencies.
As a practical matter, it is believed the examining corps of the
Patent Office would be greatly encouraged to raise the standard of
invention necessary to qualify for a full-fledged patent since the
various examining divisions could examine and issue technologi-
cal copyrights under the current classification system. It is as-
sumed that many patent disclosures of the type regularly rejected
by the Supreme Court would thus be given a protected status as
technological copyrights, a device which would be highly benefi-
cial to the industrial economy150 and would promote the constitu-
tional objective.
It would be necessary to distinguish the technological copyright
from the "non-utilitarian copyright" for purposes of enforcement.
In this regard, an effective limitation similar to that imposed on
the issuance of a design patent could be employed allowing a se-
147. Access is merely physical availability of the copied material to the copier.
148. '"The appropriation must be of a 'substantial' or 'material' part of the pro-
tected work." 18 Am. JuR. 2d Copyright and Literary Property §108 (1965) (footnote
omitted).
149. There is no apparent need for application of the patent law doctrine of
equivalents as contrasted with the copyright law doctrine of substantial duplica-
tion. Cf. Graver Tank cases, note 43 supra.
150. "On May 9, 1978, President Carter directed that an Industrial Innovation
Coordinating Committee... develop.., a set of policy options to address issues
and problems bearing on industrial innovation." 43 Fed. Reg. 24,116 (1978).
[Vol. 6: 297, 1979] Bootlegging in Patents
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
lected term of 3 1/2, 7 or 14 years, depending on the payment of an
increased fee to the government.
There are many substantial advantages to the incorporation of a
technological copyright into our present patent system. The es-
tablishment of a system of technological copyrights would, for ex-
ample, promote the progress of the sciences because a more
complete reference library would be available in the Patent and
Trademark Office. This library would include the abandoned pat-
ent applications, which are now maintained in secrecy unless vol-
untarily published by the applicant. The issuance of
technological copyrights would go far towards overcoming this
deficiency in our present patent system'51 with a much faster
turnover rate because of earlier dedication.
The legislative establishment of a technological copyright would
also serve to clarify the nebulous body of common law doctrine
relating to confidential disclosures and trade secrets.
The independent engineer or smal businessman dealing with a
large business entity as a supplier is an economic phenomenon
occurring with increasing regularity. If the advantages of a tech-
nological copyright were made available to such an entrepreneur
he would be afforded the opportunity to safely bargain, sell and
protect the type of meritorious technological developments and
discoveries which are presently unpatentable and uncopyright-
able, but which involve burdensome engineering, development,
and production expenditures.
The common law doctrine currently available to practitioners
protecting creativity embodies a hodgepodge of legal reasoning
frequently couched in terms of property rights, quasi-contract or
quantam meruit, breach of contract, and trade secrets. The courts
have struggled with the distortions of these established legal cate-
gories appearing in various branches of substantive law in an at-
tempt to safeguard the entrepreneur against fraud, piracy and
stealing, largely because of the void between the availability of
valid patent and copyright protection.
The Supreme Court has withdrawn the lower courts' power to
preempt the federal patent and copyright laws by granting protec-
tion to newly discovered improvements under state unfair com-
151. The Patent Office practice of publishing disclosure by way of a defensive
publication has not proved to be a particularly popular device. No official statistics
are currently available.
peition legislation. 152 Thus, the technological copyright would
serve as a federal codification of the principle that those who copy
with impunity should not be rewarded by society at large, a moral
principle that appears to have a sound ground in our folklore.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office has warned of
the burgeoning problems of information storage and retrieval it
confronts. In a vast reorganization move estimated to have cost
$250,000, the Patent Office administration, in 1962-63, undertook to
regroup the Examining Divisons to more realistically classify the
arts, and to streamline the examining procedure. However, the
reclassification has not materially improved the record of "dispos-
als" (applications processed to issue or final termination).
Although the technological copyright approach discussed above
would assist the Patent and Trademark Office in the administra-
tion of an improved standard of patentability, it would not relieve
the Patent and Trademark Office of its growing problems respect-
ing the search for novelty. Most applicants would probably file an
application on the basis of a request for a formal patent. Failing
in that request, they could then petition to transfer the applica-
tion to the status for registration of a claim to technological copy-
right. In the alternative, the structure of the system adopted
could be similar to that adopted and currently used by the
Netherlands, France, Japan, Australia, Brazil and Germany.153
Each of these countries utilizes a deferred examination concept
and awards "petty patents" under various names.
In France, a patent applicant must request an examination and
pay a substantial examination fee within two years of the filing of
his patent application. If no such request is made, the patent ap-
plication becomes a "certificate of utility" for a period of six years
from the date of filing. Chemical compositions are not eligible.
In Japan, a patent application may be converted into a "utility
model," even after an examination has resulted in the denial of a
request for a Japanese patent. A life period of a "utility model" is
152. Compco Corp, 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
153. For discussions on German and Japanese patent law see generally Graet-
tinger, Some Practical Aspects of (West) German Patent Practice, 54 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 322 (1972); Hagen, Scope of Protection of a German Patent, 55 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC'Y 401 (1973); Lynfleld, German Utility Models, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 374 (1965);
Muller, German Patent Law, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 89 (1977); Sharp, Japanese Pat-
ent Practice and the Impact Thereof upon American Commerce, 55 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 712 (1973); Tanabe & Wegner, Japanese Patent Law, (Pts. 1-4) 58 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 565, 647, 703, 768 (1976); Petty Patents in the Federal Republic of Germany: a
Solution to the Problem of Computor Software Protection? 8 Sw.U.L. REV. 888
(1976).
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ten years from the date of publication. Again, chemical composi-
tions are not eligible.
In Germany, a patent applicant may file with his regular patent
application an auxiliary Gebrauchmuster. If an infringer appears
while the regular patent application is being prosecuted before
the German Patent Office, the auxiliary Gebrauchmuster can be
issued immediately to serve as the basis of an infringement ac-
tion. The life of the Gebrauchmuster is five years.
Under the deferred examination approach, the order of proce-
dure would be reversed. Patent applications would be examined
initially only for matters of form, whereupon the disclosure would
be promptly published and registered. Prompt publication is a
sine qua non. During this period of registration, the registrant
would be entitled to the protection of a technological copyright for
either a fixed prescribed term, or until issuance of formal letters
patent based on the same disclosure.
Upon filing an appropriate petition and paying additional fees
more nearly commensurate with the cost involved, the petitioner
could then request a search for novelty and issuance of formal let-
ters patent for the remainder of an extended term.
Meanwhile, the disclosure having been published, the various
market factors in the free enterprise system would assist the Ex-
aminers of the United States Patent and Trademark Office in
searching for and locating the most pertinent prior art. Thus, by
the time a judgment was made regarding patentability or "nonob-
viousness," the Patent Office Examiners would be able to afford
the applicant the virtual equivalent of an inter partes considera-
tion.
That alternative appears to be particularly consonant with the
principles of free enterprise inasmuch as it shifts the cost of
searching directly onto the parties affected without unnecessarily
raising the cost of entering a new business and without necessi-
tating an increase in the size or cost of the affected government
agency.
It has been more than twenty-five years since there has been
any major patent legislation, a quarter century marked by a gen-
eral disenchantment with the patent system on the part of Ameri-
can industry.1 54 It is incumbent upon the bar to provide the
leadership and proposals necessary to revitalize the system.
154. In 1977, of 109,773 patent applications filed in the United States Patent &
Trademark Office, 39,663 were filed by foreign citizens. [1977] COMM. OF PAT. AND
T.M. ANN. REP.
